Strategists, policy makers and
political pundits of all persuasions have questioned President Obama’s strategy
for the threats in Iraq and Syria. So perhaps a good place for this strategy
blog to begin the New Year is with the best explanation of that strategy I have
seen.
Curiously
(or perhaps tellingly) that explanation is not from a Presidential speech or
official document, but from a news article in the Wall Street Journal. Dated Dec. 27, 2014, and titled The
Weekend Interview with John Allen: Inside the War Against the Islamic State
, it identifies five “common purposes”
shared by the 60 international partners supposedly dedicated to the defeat of
IS:
·
Winning the military campaign,
·
Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters,
·
Countering IS finance,
·
Providing humanitarian relief, and
·
Delegitimizing the ideology of IS as a movement.
This is far from a COMPLETE
strategy, as the partners must operationalize and then accomplish each “purpose.”
HOW, for example, are we going to win the military campaign against 30,000
fanatics now carefully mixed in with a civilian populace? HOW are we going to
disrupt the flow of fighters from Western nations sensitive to civil liberties
and careful to protect individual rights? But it does offer a framework for thinking
about what set of causes might result in the desired effect – the defeat and
destruction of the Islamic State in a way that prevents its resurgence.
Allen, for those who do not
know, is a retired four-star Marine, and President Obama's "special
envoy" to the several-score nations and groups who have joined in
opposition to the Islamic State. To his credit, reporter Joseph Rago pressed Allen
for an explanation of the planned “end state,” and received an instructive
answer.
The central threat of IS, Allen
argues, is not just to the people of Iraq or even the US, but to the
interpretation of Islam. If the radical IS vision takes root, then every more
moderate interpretation in the world becomes the target of conquest and
subjugation. As a measure of the extremist nature of this vision, the global terror
group Al Qaeda is on the IS list as too moderate. Thus it goes without saying
that governments with which the West regularly cooperates (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Yemen, Pakistan, etc.) would ultimately be targeted as enemies.
Allen’s solution – which is to
say, the solution proposed by President Obama and his partners – is “to delegitimize
Daesh [Allen refers to IS by an Arabic term], and expose it for what it
really is.” Presumably this means to demonstrate that the violence and intolerance
demonstrated by IS is counter-Islamic in its ideology and its actions. The
problem with this approach is that the violence and intolerance is not being
hidden – it is in fact a major point of attraction for new adherents. The
central message of IS is that their extreme vision of Islamic belief and
practice is the correct interpretation; enforcing it pleases Allah by doing his
will.
The
strategic logic here leads to a striking conclusion: “that the war the US is
waging against IS in Iraq and Syria ‘belongs to a larger intellectual,
religious and political movement, what [Alan] describes as ‘the rescue of Islam.’"
Ultimately then, the strategy of our
President and his partner nations is to buy Muslims and Muslim regimes enough
time and space to develop a convincing explanation of why the Islamic States’ interpretation
of Islam is wrong, and why a more tolerant vision that can strike peaceful accommodations
with other believers and non-believers is correct.
Kudos
to General Alan for his coherent explanation, and to reporter Joseph Rago for putting
these critical concepts together in a single short article. Now at least the American people can debate
the Administration’s approach to IS with an objective understanding of the
intent, and without political baggage and invective. I remain skeptical. But at
least we have a place to begin a useful debate.
