One of the findings of the 9/11
Commission was that information developed by US intelligence agencies and
forwarded to the President was not fully coordinated across those agencies. Since
1947, the Director of the CIA had also been the Director of Central
Intelligence, and in theory was the integrator of information developed by all
16 members of the “Intelligence Community” (IC). But in fact, the various agencies did not
always work well together, contributing to the failure to “connect the dots” before
9/11. As a result, the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was
established by The Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Additionally, congressional inquiry into
the failure to find the much ballyhooed WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) in
Iraq after the US invasion also turned up the distressing fact that several
intel chiefs claimed to have disagreed with the WMD report that went to the
President. But they maintained that they performed their duty adequately when
they simply refused to “sign off,” and felt no responsibility for failing to
advise the President of their reservations.
Congress was not amused by such game
playing, and insisted that in the future the new DNI coordinate all efforts at
the most senior levels of the IC. Unfortunately, congressional patrons of various
individual agencies (like the CIA, FBI, DOD, etc.) stepped in to block
authority in the only two areas that really matter to bureaucracies: personnel
and funding. And so the DNI’s power to actually coordinate the IC remains
limited.
That said, the DNI can still require
IC leaders to review various national level reports, and either concur or state
the reasons they disagree. For this reason the DNI’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, recently
presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, really does represent
the position of the entire US Intelligence Community. And the report for 2013 offers
some interesting insights into how the IC sees the world.
Perhaps the most striking point
about the assessment is the top billing it gives to cyber threats against the
United States. While careful to note that there is only “a remote chance of a
major cyber attack against US critical infrastructure systems during the next
two years,” it nonetheless points out that cyber technologies are growing
faster than we can understand “the security implications and mitigate potential
risks.” And so we might find that an unexpected cascade of failures follows a
relatively limited attack, as vulnerabilities “at one node might spill over and
contaminate” other parts of a network. Neither the examples provided (banks,
stock exchanges, private companies, electrical grids) nor the implications of
attack are new. But the prominence accorded the threat of attack is new, as is the emphasis on cyber
espionage, which is closing our lead in military technology, and reducing our
economic advantage internationally.
A second insight from the assessment
is the emphasis on transnational organized crime as a threat to the United
States. Terrorism remains a concern, of course, and the dedication of Al Qaeda
and other jihadist threats to attacks mounted on US soil or overseas remains
undiminished. But continued US pressure (ie, targeted killing) has forced terrorist threats into what the report
calls “a transitional period as the global jihadist movement becomes
increasingly decentralized.” In other words, our main enemy has been smashed
into splinter groups. Unfortunately, at the same time, the threat
from organized crime has risen to unprecedented levels.
At the top of this list is drug
trafficking. Mexico and Colombia still lead the list of countries sending
poison into the US in the form of heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, and
cocaine. Meanwhile, the violence and
corruption associated with the drug trade extends beyond these two countries to
undermine government and stability in West Africa and Afghanistan as well. And
money laundering to the tune of more than a trillion dollars annually spreads
corruption globally, while endangering the US financial system through the
illicit flow of dollars around the world. Even more disturbing is the blurring
of the line between government, intelligence, business and criminal enterprise
in many countries, making reliable business, military and diplomatic relations
almost impossible.
Of special note in the testimony is
the trafficking of up to 20 million humans around the world, mostly for illegal
exploitation as sex slaves and oppressed workers.
Of course the testimony lists many
of the “regular suspects” who always appear as continuing threats to the United
States, including WMD proliferation, dangers to the network of global supplies
and resources, and growing capabilities of potential enemies to impact US
assets in space. And long standing regional concerns continue to evolve from
the Middle East to South Asia, East Asia, Russia, Africa, and the Americas.
Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela offer special concerns in this latter category,
given the potential for unpredictable events in each area.
These last issues really represent
nothing new for the IC, whose job it is to watch worrying trends and foresee
unfavorable developments before they develop. In general, we need to stay awake
to these threats, but we do not need to lose sleep over them.
But it is impossible to read this
congressional testimony by the Director of National Intelligence without
getting the impression that something new and dangerous is afoot in the areas
of cyber security and transnational organized crime. The DNI has done his job.
We have a warning integrated across the entire Intelligence Community. Now it
is time for the Administration and Congress to pause from their focus on
politics and focus on strategic solutions to these very real problems while we
still have time to forestall them.
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